The death of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, a Nigerian national and second-in-command of ISIL, marks a notable achievement for counterterrorism efforts. However, analysts in the Lake Chad Basin see it as an indicator of the region’s persistent and evolving instability.

Resurgence of Armed Groups and Strategic Challenges

Al-Minuki was operating out of a compound near Lake Chad, a central hub for one of the world’s most active armed group theatres. His choice of location highlights the conditions driving a surge in violence by both ISWAP, an ISIL affiliate in West Africa, and Boko Haram, its rival.

A quiet resurgence of Boko Haram has also been observed while security agencies have focused more on ISWAP. Nimi Princewill, a security expert in the Sahel, explained that this shift allowed Boko Haram to regroup. “This seems to have enabled both factions to rebuild strength and carry out further attacks in the area,” he told Al Jazeera.

Regional Coordination and Border Vulnerabilities

Beyond the tactical maneuvers of ISWAP and Boko Haram, the resurgence of violence in the Lake Chad Basin highlights broader regional challenges. Kabir Amadu, managing director of Symbol Security and Intelligence Limited in Nigeria, noted that porous borders in the Sahel allow jihadi elements and their weapons to move freely. “The situation in Mali has made the Sahel a more permissive environment for armed groups, amplifying risks for Nigeria through spillover dynamics,” he said.

Efforts by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to harmonise military operations are frequently hindered by logistical issues, differing command structures, and uneven resource allocation. These gaps allow armed groups to exploit weak points along porous borders.

Local communities face dual pressures of insecurity and humanitarian deprivation. Informal networks often provide protection and sustenance, which can inadvertently create corridors for armed rebels. Humanitarian agencies report that civilians are increasingly caught in cycles of displacement and forced recruitment, while regional security forums struggle to implement preventative measures beyond military interventions.

Economic Factors and Recruitment Dynamics

Economic factors also contribute to the resurgence of both groups. Control of the Lake Chad islands offers authority over taxation routes, smuggling corridors, and resource extraction, making the islands potentially lucrative areas of competition. Boko Haram’s mix of ideological and criminal operations, including robbery and kidnapping, funds its activities and attracts disaffected youth.

Recruitment is influenced by the region’s fragile socioeconomic conditions, including high poverty and unemployment, rather than ideology alone. Former combatants rejoining Boko Haram after facing limited life prospects are a significant issue. ISS research found that former ISWAP members, who would face execution for deserting their group, were joining Boko Haram’s Ghazwah wing in Borno, known for robbery and ransom operations.

Groups exploit gaps in local governance and security presence to consolidate influence. Remote communities experience inconsistent law enforcement, limited state services, and weak administrative oversight, creating spaces where armed groups can operate with relative impunity.

Chris Ogunmodede, a Nigerian political analyst, explained that ISWAP and Boko Haram have become active again in the Lake Chad Basin for three main reasons: their resilience and ability to adapt to the evolving tactics of the Nigerian armed forces; the lucrative economy of violence that sustains their funding and manpower; and the Nigerian state’s limited ability to establish a legitimate, lasting presence in the region that could undermine their credibility.

Many of the factors driving armed attacks in the Lake Chad Basin are unlikely to be solved by military operations alone. The conditions that give ISWAP and Boko Haram their recruitment base, logistical support, and social legitimacy in some communities can be traced to decades of poverty, displacement, governance gaps, and political exclusion.

Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows the region hosts 2.9 million internally displaced people, including 2.3 million in Nigeria. Violence has forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the Lake Chad Basin, while humanitarian actors received just 19 percent of the funding required for 2025.

Abiola Sadiq, a security consultant, stated, “ISWAP and Boko Haram’s recent resurgence reflects not simply a military setback, but a deepening governance vacuum across the Lake Chad Basin.”

With Nigeria’s 2027 general elections approaching, these groups are highly likely to intensify their operations, potentially extending attacks beyond their traditional strongholds in the Lake Chad Basin and northeastern Nigeria, Sadiq added.