The Arab regional system is experiencing a significant metamorphosis, driven by a series of geopolitical events that have reshaped the Middle East and the broader MENA region. This transformation began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and gained momentum with the 2022 war in Ukraine, which further intensified the strategic recalibration of the region.

Shifting Power Dynamics

The traditional center of gravity in the Arab world has shifted from the Mashreq to the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as the new structuring poles, engaging in economic and strategic competition that has altered the geopolitical landscape.

According to analyses of inter-Arab conflicts, the ideological framework of pan-Arabism has given way to geopolitical and sectarian rivalries. This shift has led to the rise of intra-state conflicts, such as civil wars and institutional collapse, supplanting the inter-state conflicts that characterized the previous era.

Notably, the Arab League, once a central institution in regional affairs, has become increasingly ineffective. Its requirement for unanimity in decision-making has rendered it impotent in addressing conflicts, as resolutions are often reduced to symbolic gestures in the face of powerful external actors.

Foreign Influence and Non-State Actors

Foreign powers, including Iran, Russia, the United States, Turkey, China, and India, have significantly increased their presence in the Arab world. Non-state actors, such as militias and armed groups, have become key vectors of external influence, further complicating the regional dynamics.

According to a 2023 study, the Arab League’s intervention rate in 18 inter-Arab conflicts between 1946 and 1990 was only 24 percent, with a success rate of 20 percent. This performance is far below that of the Organization of American States (OAS), which achieved an intervention rate of 63 percent and a success rate of 37 percent.

The League’s institutional weakness is evident in its inability to act decisively in conflicts, as a single member state can veto any resolution. Only three crises in the League’s history—Yemen’s civil war (1962–1967), the Iraqi threat against Kuwait in 1961, and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait—led to collective security action, highlighting the organization’s limited efficacy.

Despite these challenges, the Arab League has been successful in addressing territorial integrity issues, a normative consensus that has guided its interventions in conflicts such as the Sudan-Egypt (1958) and Iraq-Kuwait (1961, 1973) disputes.

Evolving Security Strategies

In the face of the League’s limitations, Arab states have adopted more flexible and adaptive security strategies. The concept of an ‘Arab NATO’ has stalled due to structural obstacles and lack of consensus, leading to a focus on individual strategies and temporary coalitions.

According to a 2022 analysis, the Joint Arab Force project has been indefinitely postponed due to irreconcilable strategic visions and fears that such a force would serve hegemonic interests or interfere in internal affairs.

Arab military chiefs have historically been reluctant to place their troops under foreign command, given the varying perceptions of threats—ranging from Iran and Israel to terrorism. Additionally, the lack of a common definition of terrorism, particularly concerning groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, has hindered the development of a unified military doctrine.

Some Arab states have adopted a policy of hedging, maintaining balanced relations with rival powers to preserve autonomy. For example, Oman and Qatar have pursued a non-aligned approach, maintaining ties with the United States, Iran, and Turkey.

Conversely, other states have opted for bandwagoning, aligning closely with major powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United States to secure direct security guarantees. Bahrain, for instance, has aligned closely with Saudi Arabia to ensure regional stability.

Ad hoc coalitions have become the preferred model for regional security, with temporary alliances formed to address specific threats. This approach reflects a pragmatic response to the limitations of collective security institutions and the growing influence of external actors in the Middle East.